Single Idea 17309

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition]

Full Idea

Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions.

Gist of Idea

For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions

Source

Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)

Book Reference

'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.196


A Reaction

This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions!

Related Idea

Idea 17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]