Single Idea 18264

[catalogued under 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary]

Full Idea

The shape of a cone we can form for ourselves in intuition, unassisted by any experience, according to its concept alone, but the colour of this cone must be previously given in some experience or other.

Gist of Idea

We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour

Source

Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B743/A715)

Book Reference

Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.631


A Reaction

Coffa says this gives a 'transcendental twist' to the primary/secondary distinction. The distinction doesn't seem to help much, since you clearly don't know the shape of a pebble from its concept. Is the angle of the cone part of its concept?