Single Idea 18346

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths]

Full Idea

The thesis that 'truth supervenes on being' (with or without possible worlds) offers only a necessary condition for the truth of contingent propositions, whereas the standard truth-maker theory offers necessary and sufficient conditions.

Gist of Idea

'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths

Source

Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 09)

Book Reference

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.29


A Reaction

The point, I suppose, is that the change in being might be irrelevant to the proposition in question, so any old change in being will not ensure a change in the truth of the proposition. Again we ask - but what is this truth about?

Related Idea

Idea 14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]