Full Idea
'To be is to be a truth-maker' has been proposed as a replacement the standard conception of ontological commitment, that to be is to be the value of a variable.
Gist of Idea
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?
Source
Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.4.2)
Book Reference
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.16
A Reaction
[He cites Ross Cameron 2008] Unconvincing. What does it mean to say that some remote unexperienced bit of the universe 'makes truths'? How many truths? Where do these truths reside when they aren't doing anything useful?
Related Idea
Idea 18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]