Full Idea
The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides.
Gist of Idea
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics
Source
A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4
Book Reference
Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.11
A Reaction
This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese.
Related Idea
Idea 18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]