Full Idea
All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (…so it isn't a commitment to realism).
Gist of Idea
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism')
Book Reference
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.122
A Reaction
[He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'.
Related Ideas
Idea 18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Idea 18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
Idea 18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]