Full Idea
I think truthmaker theory is contingently true. [n24] If there could have been nothing, what makes that true? But if truthmaker maximalism is a necessary truth, there's necessarily something.
Gist of Idea
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4 n24)
Book Reference
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6', ed/tr. Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K [OUP 2011], p.75
A Reaction
Truthmaking is beginning to feel like Gödel's Theorems. You can 'make' lots and lots of truths ('prove' in Gödel), but there will be truths that elude the making. Truthmaker theory itself will be one example. So is Maximalism another one?
Related Idea
Idea 18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]