Single Idea 19098

[catalogued under 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth]

Full Idea

We must not move seamlessly from the thought that the correspondence theory must be deflated to the thought that any theory of truth must be deflated.

Gist of Idea

Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories

Source

Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2)

Book Reference

'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.73


A Reaction

This rather good essay offers the idea that Peircean pragmatic approaches to truth can meet the deflationary desires of the opponents of correspondence, without jettisoning all the crucial naturalistic connections with reality. Interesting.