Single Idea 19334

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique]

Full Idea

It is not enough for understanding the nature of myself, that I feel myself to be a thinking substance, one would have to form a distinct idea of what distinguishes me from all other possible minds; but of that I have only a confused experience.

Gist of Idea

I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14)

Book Reference

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence', ed/tr. Mason,HT/Parkinson,GHR [Manchester UP 1967], p.59


A Reaction

Not a criticism I have encountered before. Does he mean that I might be two minds, or might be a multitude of minds? It seems to be Hume's problem, that you are aware of experiences, but not of the substance that unites them.