Full Idea
It is widely believed that epistemic justification is distinct from other species of justification such as moral or pragmatic justification in that it is intended to serve the so-called 'truth-goal'.
Gist of Idea
Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal
Source
Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 1)
Book Reference
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.145
A Reaction
Kvanvig explicitly argues against this view. He broadens the aims, but it strikes me that other aims are all intertwined with truth in some way, so I find this idea quite plausible.
Related Idea
Idea 19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]