Full Idea
If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem').
Gist of Idea
In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified?
Source
Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1)
Book Reference
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.178
A Reaction
That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge.