Single Idea 23288

[catalogued under 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth]

Full Idea

We have to wonder how we know that it is some single concept which Tarski indicates how to define for each of a number of well-behaved languages.

Gist of Idea

When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.11)

Book Reference

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.11


A Reaction

Davidson says that Tarski makes the assumption that it is a single concept, but fails to demonstrate the fact. This resembles Frege's Julius Caesar problem - of how you know whether your number definition has defined a number.