Single Idea 4258

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification]

Full Idea

The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question.

Gist of Idea

Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief

Source

Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II)

Book Reference

'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism', ed/tr. Kornblith,Hilary [Blackwell 2001], p.15


A Reaction

The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true.