Full Idea
There is a 'moderate' nominalism (found in G.F.Stout, for example) which says that properties and relations do exist, but that they are particulars rather than universals.
Gist of Idea
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
Source
David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504)
Book Reference
'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.504
A Reaction
Both this view and the 'mereological' view seem to be ducking the problem. If you have two red particulars and a green one, how do we manage to spot the odd one out?
Related Idea
Idea 7972 Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]