Single Idea 4447

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking]

Full Idea

If man is one, and the good is one, how are they supposed to exist? Do they stay the same even though they are found in many things at the same time, and are they then entirely separated from themselves, which seems most impossible of all?

Gist of Idea

If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself?

Source

Plato (Philebus [c.354 BCE], 15a)

Book Reference

Plato: 'Complete Works', ed/tr. Cooper,John M. [Hackett 1997], p.403


A Reaction

Presumably Plato anguishes over this because he thinks Forms are self-predicating (the Good is good). Big mistake. The Good fathers good particulars which resemble itself, but are diluted?