Single Idea 4546

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties]

Full Idea

There comes a point where one realises that what one calls a property of a thing is a sensation of the feeling subject; at this point the property ceases to belong to the thing.

Gist of Idea

We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing

Source

Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §562)

Book Reference

Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'The Will to Power', ed/tr. Kaufmann,W /Hollingdate,R [Vintage 1968], p.303


A Reaction

I don't believe this. Has Nietzsche no theory about WHY we have one sensation rather than another? I prefer to distinguish primary from secondary qualities.