Full Idea
One may argue that disreputable pleasures are not pleasant; they may be pleasant to persons of unhealthy disposition, just as things may seem sweet or bitter or white to persons with unhealthy taste or vision.
Gist of Idea
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception
Source
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20)
Book Reference
Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.317
A Reaction
Aristotle's analogy gives quite good support for what seems a rather implausible view. Bentham disagrees. It certainly seems odd to deny that a sadist is obtaining pleasure. Surely that is what we object to? Is pleasure a value?