Full Idea
When I see the sun, it does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person, but we must be acquainted with that thing which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data.
Gist of Idea
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
Book Reference
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.28
A Reaction
I think this is exactly right. I personally believe that I have a very clear personal identity as I write this, but I do not believe that there is a strict identity with the person who wrote similar comments three years ago. So how do I change 'my' mind?
Related Idea
Idea 22019 Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]