Full Idea
Putnam was too quick to assert neuroscientific support for multiple realizability; current evidence does not reveal it, and there is some reason to think the enterprises of neuroscience are premised on the hypothesis of brain-state identity.
Gist of Idea
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity
Source
comment on Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968]) by Thomas W. Polger - Natural Minds Ch.1.4
Book Reference
Polger,Thomas W.: 'Natural Minds' [MIT 2004], p.24
A Reaction
I have always been suspicious of the glib claim that mental states were multiply realisable. I see no reason to think that octupi see colours as we do, or experience fear as we do, even though their behaviour has to be similar, for survival.