Single Idea 6411

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions]

Full Idea

The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims.

Gist of Idea

Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims

Source

comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2

Book Reference

Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.36


A Reaction

The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier.

Related Idea

Idea 6067 Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]