Full Idea
Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations).
Gist of Idea
The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional
Source
report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii
Book Reference
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-2
A Reaction
Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise.
Related Idea
Idea 7272 Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]