Full Idea
Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.
Gist of Idea
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5
Book Reference
Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.185
A Reaction
We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.