Full Idea
One venerable tradition, exemplified in Aquinas, has it that matter is the 'principle of individuation', that is, that all that can be guaranteed to distinguish two concrete thing of the same kind is the different matter of which they are composed.
Gist of Idea
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
Book Reference
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.200
A Reaction
This seems to be 'identity-conditions' rather than 'individuation', according to Idea 7926. The problem would be how to identify that particular matter, apart from its composing that particular object. Replacing planks on a ship seems unimportant.
Related Idea
Idea 7926 We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]