Single Idea 8308

[catalogued under 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive]

Full Idea

We must include events in our ontology because they figure indispensably in singular causal explanations.

Clarification

'Singular causation' is when the event is not repeated

Gist of Idea

Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.5)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.220


A Reaction

Hm. Spirits figure indispensably in supernatural explanations. It would be quite a task to prove that events really are indispensable to causal explanations. Why would nomological or counterfactual causal explanations not have the same need?