Full Idea
Facts seem to be indispensable as truth-makers and perhaps as causal relata, ..but if we must only include in our ontology things for which we can state a criterion of identity (Quine), ..we seem to be faced with a dilemma.
Gist of Idea
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11)
Book Reference
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.228
A Reaction
Lowe proposes to relax the identification requirement (see Idea 8312). This seems a good strategy. An awful lot of strange philosophy arises from insisting on strict conditions for our understanding, and then finding everywhere failure to achieve it.
Related Idea
Idea 8312 It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe]