Full Idea
The most notorious problem besetting the view that facts are structured complexes of constituents is the question of what it is that binds the supposed constituents into the fact. The ordered triple
Gist of Idea
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.5)
Book Reference
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.243
A Reaction
Lowe denies that facts are complex entities on this basis. You only have the problem if Mars and its redness are two 'things'. If redness is intrinsically a dependent item, we may escape. I wish they wouldn't use colours as examples. See Idea 5456.
Related Idea
Idea 5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]