Full Idea
Reliability is not a 'factual property'; in calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value. We place a high value on the reliability of our inductive and perceptual rules that lead to truth.
Gist of Idea
Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes
Source
Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)
Book Reference
'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.138
A Reaction
This doesn't seem to be a contradiction of reliabilism, since truth is a pretty widespread epistemological value. If you do value truth, then eyes are pretty reliable organs for attaining it. Reliabilism is still wrong, but not for this reason.