Single Idea 10794

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic]

Full Idea

The nominalist finds that standard semantics shackles him to first-order languages if, as nominalists are wont, he is to make do without abstract higher order objects.

Gist of Idea

The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta

Source

Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166)

Book Reference

'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.166


A Reaction

Aha! Since I am pursuing a generally nominalist strategy in metaphysics, I suddenly see that I must adopt a hostile attitude to higher-order logic! Maybe plural quantification is the way to go, with just first-order objects.