Single Idea 10822

[catalogued under 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth]

Full Idea

We need to add theories of primitive reference to Tarski's account if we are to establish the notion of truth as a physicalistically acceptable notion.

Gist of Idea

A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory

Source

comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §4

Book Reference

'The Nature of Truth', ed/tr. Lynch, Michael P. [MIT 2001], p.381


A Reaction

This is the main point of Field's paper, and sounds very plausible to me. There is something major missing from Tarski, and at some point there needs to be a 'primitive' notion of thought and language making contact with the world, as it can't be proved.