Single Idea 11889

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects]

Full Idea

The argument for unshareable properties (the Reduplication Argument) suggests the danger of reduplication of Berkeley; the argument for incompatible properties (Multiple Occupancy) says Berkeley and Hume could be in the same possible object.

Gist of Idea

Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences


Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.8)

Book Reference

Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.34

A Reaction

These are her arguments in favour of essential properties being necessarily incompatible between objects. Whatever the answer, it must allow essences for indistinguishables like electrons. 'Incompatible' points towards a haecceity.