Single Idea 11913

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism]

Full Idea

For the nominalist, belonging to the extension of a predicate is just an inexplicable ultimate fact.

Gist of Idea

For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts

Source

George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.2)

Book Reference

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.24


A Reaction

I sometimes think of myself as a nominalist, but when it is summarised in Molnar's way I back off. He seem to be offering a third way, between platonic realism and nominalism. It is physical essentialist realism, I think.