Single Idea 11936

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind]

Full Idea

There have only been two serious proposals for distinguishing mind from matter. One appeals to intentionality, as per Brentano and his medieval precursors. The other, harking back to Descartes, Locke and empiricism, uses the capacity for consciousness.

Gist of Idea

The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness


George Molnar (Powers [1998], 3.5.3)

Book Reference

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.71

A Reaction

Personally I take both of these to be reducible, and hence have no place for 'minds' in my ontology. Focusing on Chalmers's 'Hard Question' was the shift from the intentionality view to the consciousness view which is now more popular.