Single Idea 12153

[catalogued under 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity]

Full Idea

Frege's position is that 'being the same F as' splits up into a general relation and an assertion about the referent ('being the same' and 'being an F'). This is what Geach denies, when he says there is no such thing as being 'just the same'.

Gist of Idea

Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F

Source

comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by John Perry - The Same F I

Book Reference

'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.91


A Reaction

It looks as if you can take your pick - whether two things are perfectly identical, or whether they are identical in some respect. Get an unambiguous proposition before you begin the discussion. Identify referents, not kinds of identity, says Perry.