Single Idea 12423

[catalogued under 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique]

Full Idea

Philosophers who hope to avoid commitment to abstract entities by claiming that mathematical statements are analytic must show how analyticity is, or provides a species of, truth not requiring reference.

Gist of Idea

Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference?

Source

Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 04.I)

Book Reference

Kitcher,Philip: 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' [OUP 1984], p.68


A Reaction

[the last part is a quotation from W.D. Hart] Kitcher notes that Frege has a better account, because he provides objects to which reference can be made. I like this idea, which seems to raise a very large question, connected to truthmakers.