Single Idea 12513

[catalogued under 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity]

Full Idea

Should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter the body of a cobbler, everyone sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable for the prince's actions. But who would say he is the same man?

Gist of Idea

If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler)

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.15)

Book Reference

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.340


A Reaction

This is another case of conceivability being misleading about possibility. I take this transfer to be utterly (metaphysically) impossible, and hence not a good 'intuition-pump' for assessing what personal identity means.