Single Idea 12612

[catalogued under 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence]

Full Idea

For some things, the cause of their necessity is something other than themselves, whereas for others there is no such external cause, but rather they are themselves the necessary cause of other things being the case. The simple is fundamentally necessary.

Gist of Idea

Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b14)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.121


A Reaction

What is 'simple' is what terminates an explanation, and that is what-it-is-to-be each thing (its essence). The Greek view of necessity always seems to be a power to which we submit, rather than a passive state like true-in-all-worlds.

Related Idea

Idea 15108 Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]