Single Idea 13453

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification]

Full Idea

If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.

Gist of Idea

Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects


Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)

Book Reference

'Absolute Generality', ed/tr. Rayo,A/Uzquiano,G [OUP 2006], p.8

A Reaction

That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve na´ve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.