Single Idea 13663

[catalogued under 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism]

Full Idea

Some authors (Poincaré and Russell, for example) were disposed to reject properties that are not definable, or are definable only impredicatively.

Clarification

'Impredicative' definitions tend towards circularity

Gist of Idea

Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively

Source

Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.1)

Book Reference

Shapiro,Stewart: 'Foundations without Foundationalism' [OUP 1991], p.174


A Reaction

I take Quine to be the culmination of this line of thought, with his general rejection of 'attributes' in logic and in metaphysics.