Single Idea 13895

[catalogued under 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique]

Full Idea

The general view is that Russell's Paradox put paid to Frege's logicist attempt, and Russell's own attempt is vitiated by the non-logical character of his axioms (esp. Infinity), and by the incompleteness theorems of Gödel. But these are bad reasons.

Gist of Idea

The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems

Source

Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 4.xvi)

Book Reference

Wright,Crispin: 'Frege's Conception of Numbers' [Scots Philosophical Monographs 1983], p.131


A Reaction

Wright's work is the famous modern attempt to reestablish logicism, in the face of these objections.

Related Idea

Idea 13863 Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]