Single Idea 13960

[catalogued under 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths]

Full Idea

Both the 'primary' and 'secondary' intension qualify as truths in virtue of meaning; they are simply true in virtue of different aspects of meaning.

Gist of Idea

In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning

Source

David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 1.2.4)

Book Reference

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.62


A Reaction

This is the view of two-dimensional semantics, which has split Fregean sense into an a priori and an a posterior part. Chalmers is trying to hang onto the idea that we might see necessity as largely analytic.

Related Ideas

Idea 13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]

Idea 13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]