Single Idea 14193

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind]

Full Idea

Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation.

Gist of Idea

'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal


L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], 1)

Book Reference

'Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives 20)', ed/tr. Hawthorne,John [Blackwell 2006], p.334

A Reaction

A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures.