Single Idea 14195

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind]

Full Idea

If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort.


'De re' properties are real, and intrinsic to the thing

Gist of Idea

If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort


L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], 1)

Book Reference

'Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives 20)', ed/tr. Hawthorne,John [Blackwell 2006], p.340

A Reaction

See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary.

Related Ideas

Idea 14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]

Idea 14745 If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]