Single Idea 14359

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals]

Full Idea

In the no-truth theory of conditionals they have justified assertion or acceptability conditions but not truth conditions. ...The motivation is that only assertions have truth values, and conditionals are arguments, not proper assertions.

Gist of Idea

Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions

Source

Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'No-truth')

Book Reference

'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Devitt,M/Hanley,R [Blackwell 2006], p.219


A Reaction

Once I trim this idea down to its basics, it suddenly looks very persuasive. Except that I am inclined to think that conditional truths do state facts about the world - perhaps as facts about how more basic truths are related to each other.