Single Idea 14404

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts]

Full Idea

Lewis takes the counterpart relation to be sortal-relative, so he (no less than Quine) denies that objects, qua existing, are necessarily a certain way.


'qua' means insofar as

Gist of Idea

The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way


report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986]) by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology 5.III n10

Book Reference

Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.112

A Reaction

Does this mean that there could be two different versions of the same possible world (certainly not!), or that worlds are entirely created by our concepts rather than by what is actually possible.