Full Idea
Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs.
Gist of Idea
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
Source
report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2
Book Reference
'Two-Dimensional Semantics', ed/tr. Garcia-Carpentero/Macia [OUP 2006], p.3
A Reaction
This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values.