Single Idea 15022

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism]

Full Idea

The familiar complaint against Lewis is that if his worlds existed, they'd be part of actuality.

Gist of Idea

If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality


comment on David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 11.5

Book Reference

Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.248

A Reaction

Sider presents that as rather superficial, but it sounds a pretty good objection to me. Lewis would note that only our world has the indexical features which he says pick out actuality. Real possible worlds might lack indexical features?