Single Idea 15129

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism]

Full Idea

If two worlds differ in what they represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way, I shall call that a haecceitist difference. Haecceitism, then, says there are at least some haecceitist differences between worlds.

Gist of Idea

Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity


David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 4.4)

Book Reference

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.221

A Reaction

Lewis bases this view on Kaplan. My brief summary of this is that 'identity may be hidden'. If all electrons are different, what distinguishes them?