Single Idea 15243

[catalogued under 27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement]

Full Idea

A moving thing is perceptually distinct from a motionless thing, but takes on no new quality. The perception of its motion is a genuine perception. Its motion is not inferred from observation of its successive occupations of different relative positions.

Gist of Idea

We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II)

Book Reference

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.51


A Reaction

This seems to be a response to Russell's reductive 'at-at' account of motion, which always struck me as wrong. It doesn't prove Russell wrong, of course, and they are trying to demonstrate that we perceive causation directly.