Single Idea 15257

[catalogued under 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events]

Full Idea

By a shift from events to things we claim to make the big problem of induction tractable.

Gist of Idea

The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.II)

Book Reference

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.76


A Reaction

[You'll have to read their chapter to get the whole picture] The idea of basing a metaphysics on 'events' gives me the creeps, given the difficulty of individuating an event. Events are not primitive; even animals can analyse their components.