Single Idea 15319

[catalogued under 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff]

Full Idea

There is no metaphysical justification whatever for treating the solid, bounded, material object as the determiner of all thing concepts. Fluids are no less material things than are hard solid blocks.

Gist of Idea

Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV)

Book Reference

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.180


A Reaction

We don't tend to talk of a fluid as 'a' thing, and without distinct objects there would be virtually no structure, or interest, in nature, so what gives identity to the blocks must interest the metaphysician.